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Legal
Developments
SOCIAL SECURITY:
The Promises, Problems and Possibilities —

Part I
Dr. Patrica C. Elliott, CPA
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

If Diogenes were around today he would
have more difficulty finding a person
satisfied with the present Social Security
system than he had finding the honest
man (sic). Working wives are unhappy
because their husbands are not routinely
covered as are the wives of working hus
bands; poor people and liberals are un
happy because the tax is regressive in na
ture; the conservatives are unhappy be
cause the benefit structure is geared more
toward need than based on contributions
the way private annuities are; retired
people are unhappy because their pen
sions are not keeping pace with the costof-living index; employers and employees
are unhappy because the rate is a whop
ping 5.85% on the first $15,300 of gross
salary per year and both the rate and the
base are scheduled to rise in the future;
economists are unhappy because (unless
something is done soon) the current tax
rate will have to be tripled in the next 75
years to cover the widening deficit; tax
payers are unhappy because over one-half
of them paid more in Social Security taxes
than they did in income taxes last year;
politicians are unhappy because all of their
constituents are unhappy (and unhappy
voters tend to vote the old rascals out and
the new rascals in); and the Social Security
Administration is unhappy because
everybody is blaming them and they do
not like the situation any better than any
body else. The most tragic fact of all is that
all these people are absolutely right — the
present Social Security system does do all
these things to all these people.
How could a system with such a socially
desirable and benevolent purpose be so
positively messed up? One way to answer
this question is to examine the evolution of
the Social Security laws and perhaps sort

through how the original goals changed
because of changing social and political
mores. There may or may not be a way to
appease everyone but it might be useful to
examine some suggested alternatives.

The Promises
The Social Security Act of 1935 was signed
into law by President Roosevelt amidst
many misgivings by the population of
Depression-era America. The Depression
had clearly shown that some type of finan
cial security was desperately needed by
older people, yet the majority of the popu
lation was afraid that such a system would
undermine the Puritan-ethic based ideas
of thrift and hard work. The original law
was not intended to provide an adequate
pension for comfortable living in the
worker's old age; it was intended to be a
supplement to personal savings and a bare
minimum or "floor of protection" for re
tirees.
Prior to this law it was assumed that the
worker would work until death or be sup
ported by family members and savings in
cases of illness or disability. The assump
tion was not too unreasonable for several
reasons. First, the population was pre
dominantly rural, where three genera
tions in a family dwelling was not un
common. In a rural setting, workers were
still valuable even if the tasks assumed in
old age were different from those per
formed during one's youth. It simply took
all hands to keep a family farm operating.
Even in the cities it was more usual for
older people to live with grown children
than to maintain a separate household1
and to continue working into their old age.
The life expectancy for all Americans
was substantially shorter than it is now.
The life expectancy for a man in 1910 was

46.3 years; by 1970 it had risen to 67.1. A
female's life expectancy rose during that
period from 48.3 years to 74.6 years.2
After the passage of the Social Security
Act of 1935 (but before any payments to
retirees were made), two major changes in
emphasis occurred: first, the funding of
benefits was put on a pay-as-you-go basis.
It was quickly recognized that no mean
ingful benefits could be paid for several
years if benefits were to be based on the
retiree's contributions. The second shift
was to emphasize the social and financial
need of the recipients and the benefits
were heavily weighted in favor of low
income workers and workers with depen
dent wives. Thus, before the first pay
ments were made in 1940, the function of
Social Security had been split into two
(sometimes incompatible) functions: The
welfare function and the insurance (an
nuity) function.
With World War II industrialization and
urbanization flowered along with the
breaking up of extended families. With the
movement of women into the labor force
during the war and the subsequent post
war baby boom, it became more attractive
to retire older workers in order to make
room for younger ones.
Dr. Alicia Munnell, an economist rec
ognized as an expert on Social Security,
maintains that Social Security has histori
cally had a dual impact on retirement and
savings.3 First, an employee was less re
luctant to require an employee who had a
pension (Social Security) to retire than one
who did not. Since Social Security cover
age is mandatory (with a few exceptions),
almost all employees were covered and
the trend toward forced retirement at the
arbitrary age of 65 (the age at which bene
fits were originally paid) was begun. Since
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people then began to expect to retire at 65
and had a longer life expectancy, they
began to save more to supplement their
modest Social Security benefits. This was
in contrast to the opposite impact of hav
ing less to save because of the Social Secu
rity tax one had to pay. The dual effects
tended to negate each other with the ten
dency being toward more total savings.
Since 1945 the system has been radically
expanded. Because increasing the benefits
and coverage was a politically "good”
thing to do, the coverage and benefits
were raised astronomically. The
maximum benefits for a retiree and de
pendent spouse have risen from about
$150 per month in 1955 to almost $600 per
month in 1976.4 Benefits for survivors,
disability and hospital insurance were
added to the original pension. Any time
benefits were raised, they were extended
to cover not only current retirees but pres
ent workers when they did retire in the
future. As the benefits expanded, the
maximum taxes to support the expendi
tures have risen from about $200 per year
in 1955 to $1,800 per year in 1976. (Half is
withheld from the employee and half is
paid by the employer.)5
With Congress constantly raising bene
fits (a politically expedient thing to do) and
tying benefits to the inflation rate, they are
spending nonexistent funds and are
promising workers huge benefits for
which funding has not yet been arranged.

The Problems
With the rapidly rising benefits workers
have begun to view Social Security not as a
"floor” to be supplemented by private sav
ings, but as their total retirement savings.
As rates of taxation rise, workers expect
their future benefits to rise when in actual
ity the increased taxes are going to pay off
present retirees' increased benefits. Still,
people cling to the idea that their taxes are
funding their future benefits. Some6 feel
the Social Security Administration en
courages this belief by talking about the
"huge reserves” (which will, in fact, be
totally exhausted by 1980) in such a way as
to make the public believe that their pen
sions are, in fact, funded. John A. Brittain,
a Brookings Institute economist, does not
worry about the "bankruptcy" of the sys
tem because Social Security is "backed by
the most solid source of funds known, the
federal taxing power. The bankruptcy
charge is a senseless generator of fear.”7
If the bankruptcy scare is senseless, cer
tain other facts are not. All predicted taxes
are based on population estimates which
have been radically altered by the falling
birth rate. While life expectancies have
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risen very little in 20 years, the birth rate
has declined dramatically. A major popu
lation shift is occurring: One in seven
Americans is now receiving Social Secu
rity and by 2005 there may be only two
workers to support each pensioner.8
Since benefits are tied to inflation, the
expenditures in the past few years of
double-digit inflation have exceeded all
projections. Furthermore, there is a builtin double inflation raise. No one objects
too much to raising retirees' benefits, but
under the 1972 formula (which tied bene
fits to inflation), an oversight occurred.
Not only are retirees' pensions raised for
inflation, future retirees' pensions are
raised. Those who are not yet retired pre
sumably receive inflation-keyed raises
which automatically give them higher
scheduled benefits by putting them in
higher maximum benefit brackets. This,
coupled with the additional inflation raise,
gives present workers a double adjust
ment upwards for inflation. If rapid infla
tion continued over a long period, it
would be possible for today's workers to
receive larger pensions than their former
salaries!
Another problem is that personal sav
ings for retirement are now declining. Dr.
Munnell believes there will be a serious
decline in personal savings in the future.9
If this does happen, it will mean that So
cial Security benefits will probably rise to
fill the need which will result in higher
taxes and even less personal savings. This,
together with the lower worker-retiree
ratio, could have drastic effects on the tax
rates.
Another set of serious problems (and of
particular interest to women) are centered
around the concepts of "fair” and per
sonal "rights.” These problems will be
covered, along with some possible so
lutions, in Part II in the next issue.
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Theory & Practice
(Continued from p. 22)
by the possibility of errors or irregularities
in the circumstances, the auditor's judg
ment concerning the integrity of man
agement, and the relationship between
internal control and the potential for er
rors or irregularities. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, however, the
auditor's reliance on the truthfulness of a
representation or the validity of a record is
reasonable. The auditor cannot be ex
pected to detect unrecorded transactions
in the absence of finding evidence of their
existence. In determining the extent to
which corroboration of management rep
resentations is necessary, the auditor
should be aware of and consider those
circumstances that might predispose
management to misstate financial state
ments, for example, adverse financial de
velopments. However, the auditor is not
expected to obtain more than reasonable
satisfaction that management has not
made material misrepresentations or
overridden control procedures. There are
inherent limitations on the effectiveness of
internal controls which prevent the au
ditor from placing complete reliance on
them. The auditor's examination normally
includes procedures to test the existence
of errors or irregularities that could have a
material effect on the financial statements
even in the absence of material weakness
es in the system of internal control.
Additional procedures should be per
formed if the auditor believes errors or
irregularities may exist and, depending
upon the circumstances, the auditor's
opinion should be qualified or disclaimed
or the auditor may determine that the only
course is to withdraw from the engage
ment.
The auditor's role in IRS investigations
of questionable payments is apparently
settled. Now we must wait for the pro
posed Congressional bill to be enacted,
amended or dropped. However, it is
highly improbable that legislation will not
be forthcoming, even if substantially
amended. The proposals of the AICPA in
the two exposure drafts need, also, to be
finalized and may be changed before is
suance as Statements of Auditing
Standards. In the meantime, the auditor
should maintain an attitude of profes
sional skepticism in planning and con
ducting examinations of financial state
ments. Any questionable payments noted
or suspected might appropriately be han
dled at the highest level both in the au
ditor's firm and in the client's organization
complying with the procedures in the ex
posure draft on illegal acts.

